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THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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JUN 20 1990

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

AD-A223 238

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Future Role of the Army National Guard		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Study Project
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Andrew M. Schuster LTC Austin A. Stovall, Jr.		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U. S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
12. REPORT DATE 10 April 1990		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 57
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The Total Force Policy has made the Army National Guard (ARNG) an integral part of our national military strategy. Since its fruition the National Guard has conducted training throughout the world. The 1980's were outstanding years for the Total Army and especially for the Army National Guard. There are many changes taking place throughout the world. The 1990s will be challenging and exciting years. This paper reviews the Guard's history and addresses current issues facing the Army National Guard during a period of turbulence and rapid change. Future roles and missions		

for the 1990s are then postulated and explained.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER



THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

BY

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A-1	

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AUTHOR(S): Andrew M. Schuster, LTC, IN
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TITLE: The Future Role of the Army National Guard

FORMAT: Group Study Project

DATE: 10 April 1990 PAGES: 56 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the final analysis, this study will project the future roles and missions for the Army National Guard (ARNG) in the 1990s. To do this requires a brief overview of the past, a look at current organization and functions, and finally a review of proposed force structure changes and missions.

There is no question that today's Army National Guard is at its highest state of readiness - the best in its 353-year history. High quality personnel, improved training opportunities, and acquisition of modern equipment have all been contributing factors to this achievement. According to Congressman Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, "the quality of the Guard and Reserve has increased dramatically during the 80's".¹ The 1980's certainly was a period of great accomplishment for the Army National Guard. However as we look to the 90's, we must anticipate a rapidly changing environment. Perception of a reduced threat, withdrawal of troops from Europe, dwindling resources, and force structure cuts are all key issues. Congressman Aspin further observed that "if what is happening in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continues, I think we're going to see a drastically realtered military structure in this country and one that will bring a

reduction in the active duty forces and a much greater emphasis on the guard and reserve".² LTG Conaway, Chief National Guard Bureau says that "during the military buildup of the 1980s, the National Guard achieved all-time highs in strength, readiness, and professional training. The goal for the 1990s is to stay the course".³ The former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG Temple said upon his retirement in December 1989 that "the past decade unequivocally proves that given the opportunity the National Guard performs the missions assigned to it...the Guard has proven its effectiveness for today and tomorrow".⁴

Even as this paper is being composed, many changes are taking place. This study will review all of these factors and discuss possible roles and missions for the Army National Guard for the next decade and beyond.

ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Congressman Les Aspin, 9 February 1990.
2. Ibid.
3. Herbert R. Temple, "Parting Thoughts from the Chief," National Guard, January 1990, p. 74.
4. William Matthews, "New Guard Chief Speaks Out," Army Times, 5 February 1990, p. 71.

CHAPTER 11

LEARNING FROM OUR HISTORY

As the United States Army settles into an extended interwar routine, arguably for the first time since 1939, it does so in an era of unprecedented change in both the pace and scope of warfare. The military leader confronting potential war in a prewar environment must work hard to reduce the gap between training and battle.¹

Only a few decades ago, the U.S. Army was afforded considerable time to gear up for full combat. The country was not subject to wholesale invasion and mobilization could proceed at a leisurely pace. Now the United States enjoys little protection from time or distance. In fact, our preparedness to deploy rapidly in widely dispersed theaters of operation across the operational continuum provides our country's greatest defense and offers the least deterrence--short of massive nuclear retaliation--to war. Nowhere are these issues of preparedness more critical than in the ARNG. History is replete with examples in war after war where our active and reserve forces were ill-prepared at the outset of the campaign. Today a majority of military contingency plans cannot be effectively executed without committing some or many National Guard forces in the same time frame as active component forces. Therefore, during this era of "peace breaking out all over," we must learn from the history of our previous wars in order to properly prepare our forces for the next war, whenever it may occur.

The National Guard has participated in every war in which the country has been involved. Additionally, the Guard has been employed in crisis after crisis, ranging from the civil disturbances of the 50's and 60's, major mobilizations that resulted from the Soviet's adventures into Berlin and Cuba, to innumerable rescue and relief operations in individual states.

The Guard's tradition of military service reflects one of the most basic attitudes of free people. To this end, General George Washington observed that "Citizens must be prepared to devote a portion of their routines in order to be capable in defense of country." This tradition has served the United States well. In peacetime the United States has neither desired nor been willing to finance a standing active military force sufficient to meet all requirements of war.² The United States' major conflicts have been fought by an active force augmented substantially by individuals and units from mobilized reserve forces. But in almost every conflict the United States has not been properly prepared at the outset of warfare because of American unwillingness to support the needs of a trained and ready Total Force.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Before the American Revolutionary War, the militia provided the only defense of Colonial America. In 1636, the first permanent regiments of the militia were organized in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Just before the American Revolution, some militia members were designated "minutemen"--soldiers ready for duty at a minute's notice. Other militia units were

available in several hours. The militia were organized into local citizen units controlled by the Colonial Assemblies. From Lexington to Yorktown, the militia fought in every battle and provided support to the Continental Army.

Eventually the organized part of the militia became known as the National Guard. The name of the National Guard was inspired by a French hero, the Marquis de Lafayette, who had served as a major general in the Continental Army. By the 1790's, each state militia had adopted this National Guard designation.³ Thus, beginning with the battles of Lexington and Concord, the concept of mobilizing citizen-soldiers to defend our freedoms has been available to provide additional resources in time of national emergencies or war.

Although General Washington thought the militia the least dependable of the troops under his command, the militia was more representative of American society, more popular with ordinary citizens, and more consistent with republic ideals than state or continental forces. Moreover, the militia continued to seem ideally suited for carrying on a revolutionary war. Although Washington believed that only a regular army could defeat the British, time would not allow him to create such a force before the first battle. Thus it was with an untrained force serving for a relatively short period of time that he began the first battle for our country's independence at Long Island in 1775. In fact, it was sixteen months after the war began that American and British Regular Armies met for the first time. This delay

revealed the difficulties both sides had in mobilizing their regular forces.

Following the Revolutionary War, we completely disbanded our standing army, save a few officers and 80 enlisted men. This began a traditional theme that has consistently woven its way through our nation's history. We slowly prepare for war in response to deteriorating diplomatic relations, then war begins and mobilization occurs. Once the issue is resolved and things return to normal, the force is quickly reduced. Usually during these times little attention is given to the training and readiness of the National Guard.

WAR OF 1812

As our country again moved toward war in the spring of 1812, the prospects seemed encouraging, at least on paper. A small but promising regular force consisting of almost 36,000 troops existed and in reserve was a huge militia organization of approximately 100,000 soldiers. But not everything was as it seemed. No fort had a fully integrated defensive system; few, in fact, had ever had any carefully drawn defense plans. Some forts had been decaying for years; others had never been completed. Like many of the forts, the weapons that filled the arsenals were often relics of earlier times.⁴ Of the 36,000 soldiers authorized in the regular force, however, fewer than one-third had enlisted by July 1812, when war was declared.

Disaster after disaster plagued the force throughout the first year and well into the second. It was not until the third year of the war that we finally had a unit that was trained well

enough to enjoy any real success. After the conclusion of the war, soldiers continued to lament the shortsightedness of politicians, who again insisted on maintaining the smallest possible regular establishment and who would rather rely on a largely citizen army. They quickly forgot that the first encounter, the Battle of Queenston Heights, had shown how impractical such policies were.⁵

Immediately following the War of 1812, the Army was reduced to 10,000 men. The Militia forces were sent home and Federal Volunteers disbanded. Between the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico, the nation did little to support a strong Militia to balance the small standing force. Again we entered the War with Mexico in 1846 with little or no thought of preparedness.

CIVIL WAR

On 12 April 1861, President Lincoln, a former member of the Illinois militia, called for 75,000 volunteers from the militia in response to the attack by Confederate forces on Fort Sumter, South Carolina.⁶ In theory, the nation's militia stood ready to reinforce the Regular Army. Although hallowed by tradition dating back to the days of Lexington and Concord, the militia had unfortunately been allowed to degenerate into relative impotence.⁷ Again, the military forces were not prepared to fight a war. More than three million militiamen were on the rolls, but, over 350,000 of these were in seven states that had left the Union for the Confederacy. Some units were widely dispersed and could not be redeployed because of the need to fight the Indians. Many experienced troops were lost in the

political turbulence of the times, such as the surrender of 2,430 officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army in Texas when it seceded from the Union.

This meant that President Lincoln was forced, at least initially, to rely on the militia. If the Battle of Bull Run, the first battle of the Civil War, proved nothing else it clearly demonstrated that the raw material existed for molding capable Armies. Given suitable doctrine and planning, appropriate equipment and organization, and intelligent leadership, Americans made excellent soldiers.⁸

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Even so, the United States Armed Forces entered the Spanish-American War as ill-prepared as in previous 19th Century conflicts. When President McKinley elected to expel the Spanish from Cuba in 1898, the standing regular army only consisted of about 25,000 officers and men. They were scattered all over the continent in more than seventy posts. A generation of bare-bones budgets had left the Army without adequate reserves of weapons and equipment for mobilization; such austerity had kept the Endicott coast defense program--the Army's major peacetime project--perennially behind schedule.⁹

In order to temporarily enlarge the Regular Army, since both the Navy and Army believed the Army's role would be modest, Secretary of War Alger asked Congress for about 75,000 men to add recruits to existing regular units and by expanding each infantry regiment from three three-company battalions to three four-company battalions. However, this was objected to by the state

militias, now called the National Guard. Basing their appeal on the mythology of the citizen soldier and the traditional fears of a large standing army, advocates of the militia convinced Congress to defeat Alger's proposal just two weeks before hostilities began. This defeat forced the creation of a volunteer army formed around the existing National Guard. Eventually some 200,000 National Guard members were called into service. But since the War Department had not planned on their employment, no advanced preparations to assemble, equip, or supply them had been calculated. They were primarily activated to let the National Guard say they had gotten a piece of the action and to provide an outlet for their partriotic enthusiasm.

The Battle of San Juan Hill, however, exposed serious logistical deficiencies and administrative breakdowns. These problems combined with the epidemics in the volunteer camps, created a political furor that forced public attention on Army reform and provided strong arguments for Secretary of War Elihu Root's drive to create a general staff, reorganize the War Department bureaus, and reform the National Guard.¹⁰ Under Root's supervision, changes to the National Guard resulted in their being effectively integrated into the military establishment and thereafter routinely conducted divisional and larger maneuvers.

WORLD WAR I

At the outset of World War I our regular army consisted of about 6,000 officers and 120,000 enlisted men. We did have a reserve in the form of the National Guard, which had improved

somewhat since the war with Spain. There were 185,000 National Guardsmen in April 1917; this number swelled to 379,000 equalling 17 combat divisions or forty per cent of the American Expeditionary Force before the war was over. The biggest problems came from poor leadership in the junior officer ranks and a lack of combat experience by the volunteer veterans. Those who had fought in the Spanish-American War had become too old for combat service as company grade officers. This war left little doubt that the standing army could not participate on a global level war without a trained, ready force.

WORLD WAR II

Most of the American troops in the first battle of World War II came from the US 32d Infantry Division, a National Guard unit from Wisconsin and Michigan. The officers and men had recently come from the Guard and induction centers resulting from the first peacetime draft in our nation's history. By September 1940 four National Guard Divisions had been called up, then in October, the 32d Division was activated. These units immediately confronted a difficult period of personnel changes as a result of the separation of officers and men who could not meet the physical requirements, who were over age, or who had dependents who created hardship cases.¹¹

After overcoming serious personnel shortages and training in the famous Louisiana maneuvers in 1941, the 32d Division along with the 41st Division, which also sent a regiment into the battle in the latter stages, sailed for Australia. The 32d was forced to deal with unfavorable training conditions, had no

opportunity to train for jungle warfare, suffered shortages of ammunition and absorbed a large number of inexperienced replacements in preparing to meet the Japanese in Buna. Although the 32d Infantry Division was the largest unit at Buna, it never was able to perform in battle according to "A Manual for Commanders of Large Units".¹²

This was a costly opening engagement for the U.S. Army in the Pacific Campaign. Of the 14,646 American troops committed in the combat area, nearly two-thirds suffered from infectious disease; nearly half the 11,000 troops of the 32d who served came down with malaria. The men of the 32d were not well trained for the mission; as a result, it was several months before they recovered enough to fight again.¹³

This poor performance combined with the experiences of the 1st Armored Division in the Kasserine Pass clearly reveals that the mobilization process used at the outset of WW II was quickly thrown together. This process was indeed saved only by the leadership and organizational ability of men like Marshall and McNair. Again after the war, manpower was drawn down and equipment became outdated with no replacements.

KOREAN WAR

The first American battle in Korea began with the fight at Osan where Task Force Smith, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry--the Gimlets--of the 24th Infantry Division, first engaged the North Koreans. During the two weeks of delay and withdrawal, the 24th Division suffered heavy casualties. Veterans of the Division are quick to admit failure. But, in truth, the poor

performance of the 24th was more the result of inadequate preparations during the prewar years in Japan than of any specific lapse on the battlefield. The tactical defeats were rooted in the failure of the Army to prepare itself during peacetime for battle.¹⁴

This poor performance was a result of the demobilization conducted following World War II in order to meet the demands of the American people and Congress. Financial support for the military also began to decrease, resulting in a lack of training and the deferral of equipment modernization. Thus, when the Korean War began, our forces were again not ready to meet the demands placed on them.

VIETNAM WAR

Perhaps the major weakness of the U.S. Army on the eve of its involvement in Vietnam was its lack of intensive preparation for the type of war in which it would become engaged.¹⁵ As Harry Summers has written, "The sad truth is that in Vietnam our mind was never concentrated on how to win the war".¹⁶ Indeed, given the problems they faced, the 1st Cavalry Division at Ia Drang Valley performed far better than their fathers and brothers in the first battles of earlier wars.¹⁷

Again we started off a war on the wrong foot. We were buoyed by misleading anticipations of success in the first few engagements; we then failed to make the necessary adjustments to our leadership, doctrine, and strategy. This resulted in the long drawn out conflict, the results of which are painfully familiar.

CONCLUSION

Our country then has a long history of not spending the time, energy, or money necessary during peacetime to ensure our preparedness for the next war. As we begin our next drawdown of forces in the 90s, it is imperative that we review our previous mistakes so that we do not add to the list of hard-earned lessons in the first battle of the next war. We can clearly demonstrate that maintaining National Guard readiness between conflicts ensures a strong deterrence and bargaining chip at the international negotiating tables.

The National Guard's readiness today can best be seen in the Guard's recent participation in Operation Just Cause. More than a dozen National Guard units voluntarily participated in that brief conflict with little or no additional preparedness.

As our nation's leaders seriously consider force structure balance and mix, we need to remind them that the Total Force Policy has established new precedents. As we drawdown during this peacetime "builddown," let's focus on our history and avoid past precedents.¹⁸

ENDNOTES

1. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles 1776-1965, p. xi.
2. Department of Defense, Reserve Components of the U. S. Armed Forces, p. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Heller and Stofft, p. 33.
5. Ibid., p. 56.
6. Donald Burdick, "National Guard NCOs are Vital to Readiness," Army, October 1989, p. 111.
7. Heller and Stofft, p. 83.
8. Ibid., p. 108.
9. Ibid., p. 109.
10. Ibid., p. 147.
11. Ibid., p. 191.
12. Ibid., p. 188.
13. Ibid., p. 221.
14. Ibid., p. 226.
15. Ibid., p. 304.
16. Ibid., p. 305.
17. Ibid., p. 322.
18. Charles M. Kiefner, "History Speaks for Retaining a Strong Defense Structure," National Guard, February 1990, p. 39.


CHAPTER III

WHERE ARE WE TODAY

THE 80's

Our history has shown time and time again the key role the Army National Guard has played in our nation's defense. The Army National Guard has proven to be a capable and effective force. The Total Force Policy of the 1970s did much to enhance this readiness posture. The 1980s were the most prosperous years in terms of increased credibility and overall readiness. For example in 1989 the strength of the Army National Guard was 457,000, compared to 368,000 in 1980. This strength reflects a 25 percent increase in personnel and a 16 percent increase in units. Further, in 1989, 82 percent of the Army National Guard units were reported as combat ready, compared with 66 percent in 1984.¹ During the 1980's the Army National Guard achieved its

PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE (FY 1988)



largest strength, highest quantities of equipment on hand, and its best training standard in 353 years of existence.²

As the chart on the last page indicates, 50 percent of the Total Army is found in the guard and reserve, truly a significant portion of the total force:³ Thirty percent of the Total Army is now in the Army National Guard. With ten divisions and 18 brigades, the ARNG provides 43 percent of the Army's combat units. In addition, 20 percent of the Total Army combat support and combat service support capability is in the ARNG.⁴ Army Guard units account for half the Total Army's infantry and field artillery battalions, almost half its armor battalions, and more than half its armored cavalry regiments and combat engineer battalions.⁵

Fulltime support has also increased tremendously for the Army National Guard during the 1980's. In Fiscal Year 1980, the Guard had 33 thousand fulltime personnel; in Fiscal Year 1989, it had 55.5 thousand.⁶ This includes active guard reserve (AGR), military technicians, active component, and civil service personnel. Fulltime support is a direct indicator of the readiness of Army National Guard units.

Under the Total Force Policy, today's Army National Guard must be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world within days. In order to meet the demands for increased responsiveness to possible call-ups the Army National Guard continues to experience a steady increase in alert, mobilization, and deployment training. In Fiscal Year 1988, 29,937 Army Guard soldiers in 134 units and 1,068 teams and cells participated in Overseas

Deployment Training (ODT).⁷ These exercises, throughout the world, have proven the capabilities of the Guard to perform their wartime missions. The importance of ODT will increase if additional missions are transferred to the Army National Guard and if U.S. forces are further reduced overseas.

In addition, during recent years selected high priority units have received the M-1 Abrams and M60A3 tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Attack Helicopter, the Black Hawk helicopter and the improved TOW Anti-Tank vehicle. Some units have received the Hawk missile, the M198 Howitzer, the Chaparral Air Defense System, the M-293 Five Ton Cargo Truck, and the High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). All of this is part of a modernization program that has delivered a record number of new and redistributed equipment to the Army National Guard.⁸

This modernization has improved the overall readiness of the Army National Guard and has assisted in the performance of all missions whether State or Federal. The late 1980's found the ARNG involved in a new role: The War on Drugs. Types of missions have included observation and reporting, air and ground transportation, loan of specialized equipment, radar support, aerial imagery and commercial cargo inspections.

In addition to the War on Drugs, the Army National Guard has assisted civil authorities in support of natural disasters such as Hurricane Hugo and the San Francisco earthquake. The ARNG's ability to react to disasters and emergencies has indeed shown its' capabilities to respond when needed. The ARNG has

also taken an increased role in nation building, an example being Blazing Trails, a road building exercise in Honduras. The 80's have indeed enhanced the readinees of the ARNG and prepared them for the challenges of the 90's.

THE 90's

The 90's will bring further changes for the Army National Guard. However, these changes should be reflective of past history and the accomplishments of the 70's and 80's. According to Stephen M. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and John O. Marsh Jr., the former Secretary of the Army,⁹ "although excellent progress has been made in equipping National Guard and Reserve units, the shortfall of equipment on hand versus wartime requirements was over 14 billion at the end of Fiscal Year 1989". The report further stated the following two concerns about reserve components: "First, the reserve components provide a cost-effective means for augmenting the active forces and maintaining a strong deterrence. Recognizing this, budget makers are likely to try to save dollars, while maintaining capability, by transferring more missions from the active to the reserve components. The reserve components stand ready to accept additional responsibilities". The report goes on to say that these new units must be resourced and that the reserve components will have much less time for training. Second, there is concern about "the tendency to think 'equal share' reductions when budget cuts are required....'equal share' budget reductions ignore fundamental differences between the

active and reserve components, and are particularly inappropriate at a time when additional missions and force structure are being given to the reserve components."

CONCLUSION

Possible Guard missions should thus be determined on the basis of both past history of the Guard and present capabilities. Even though the Guard has recently been greatly enhanced, there remain many shortages in personnel, equipment, and full time manning. The Guard should enjoy a dynamic future, much of which will be determined by the world situation and the actions and decisions of senior leaders - today!

ENDNOTES

1. Donald Burdick, "Discusses Army Guard Readiness," National Guard, January 1990, p. 69.
2. Ibid., p. 73.
3. "Partners in the Total Force," Defense 89, September/October 1989, p. 15.
4. Donmald Burdick, "National Guard NCOs are Vital to Readiness," Army, October 1989, p. 111.
5. "Major Part of the Total Army," The National Guard Update, January 1990, p. 1.
6. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, January 1990, p. 22.
7. "Full-Time Force Grows," The National Guard Update, March 1989, p. 3.
8. Burdick, p. 67.
9. Report of Secretary of Defense, p. 67.

CHAPTER IV

LONG RANGE PLANNING GUIDANCE

The last year of the 1980s rapidly changed the face of the world and simultaneously left many unanswered questions. With the 1990s looming ahead, our expectations as a nation are clearly uncertain. In addition to the changing world situation and the actions and decisions of our leaders yet to be finalized, we also face the budget deficit, the war on drugs and the strong public support to reduce defense spending. Clearly, the ability of the Army National Guard to accomplish its missions in the future will be greatly affected by all of these factors on the environment in which it operates. The purpose of this chapter is to carefully analyze the guidance, trends, and roles which make up this environment and to insure all variables have been taken into consideration.

The following planning assumptions have been identified by the ARNG for their long-range planning guidance:¹

1. The ARNG will continue to exist as a reserve component of the Total Army with both a State and Federal mission.
2. The political structure of the United States will remain essentially the same, and the ARNG will retain its role in that structure.
3. The tactical missions of the ARNG will change as required by the Army and the Department of Defense.
4. The national military strategy, to deter war, will not change. But the threat will vary.

5. The United States will maintain a strong military, economic, and political presence throughout the world.

6. The FY 90-94 defense budgets will decline; subsequent fiscal years may achieve some real growth.

7. The Abrams tank, Bradley vehicles, Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot air defense system and Apache helicopter will remain at the core of the heavy force combat power until they reach obsolescence.

8. NATO and Warsaw Pact will remain viable alliances through the planning period.

9. Air and sealift requirements will continue to exceed US capability.

10. The number of military-available males between the ages of 17 and 27 will continue to decline through the mid-1990's and then increase slowly through the remainder of the planning period.

The following major trends have been identified as those having a potential impact upon the United States national security during the 1990s.

1. Changed nature of our perceived threat: Although the Warsaw Pact is crumbling, the military power of the Soviet Union still poses our principal threat. We have focused for years on the Warsaw Pact, but now we find this threat has been modified. While all of this has been happening, events in other parts of the world have identified potential threats to America's interests.

2. Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) negotiations: The end

result of the negotiations is not yet known. No matter what happens, the Army must be prepared to accept significant cuts in total forces and equipment available. Additionally, negotiations may necessitate relocation of these units.

3. Impact of emerging technology: Advanced technology is making the battlefield of the future a more lethal environment. The proliferation of sophisticated weaponry, ranging from advanced battle tanks to ballistic missiles, in the developing world should force the Department of Defense to prepare for a conflict that may be relatively small but will still pose a great challenge.

4. Airland Battle Future (ALBF) Concept: This concept has been under development for some time. It prescribes the new way Army forces will meet directed commitments. The ALBF concept recognizes that our requirements are truly global in nature and will require an array of force mixes to meet them.

5. Declining budget: The budget deficit and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act are having a significant impact on the way the Army and more specifically the Army National Guard will do business during the next decade. It will impact primarily upon our equipment modernization and R & D programs; as well, it will produce significant cuts to manpower and equipment.

The Army's Strategic Roles for the 1990s are:²

1. Provide forward-deployed ground forces for deterrence, sustained land combat, and conflict termination in areas of vital interest.

2. Maintain combat-ready ground forces--heavy, light, and special operations--in CONUS for immediate contingencies worldwide.

3. Maintain forces in CONUS able to reinforce forward-deployed and contingency forces.

4. Participate in interdiction of illicit drug traffic, disaster relief, and assistance during other emergencies.

5. Provide peacetime support to allied and friendly nations through peacekeeping, security assistance, and army-to-army initiatives.

Add to this guidance, trends, and roles General Vuono's description of the Army of the future as one that must be versatile, deployable, and lethal. He states, "In view of the rapidly changing international environment, the precise time, location and nature of the threat will always be uncertain. Consequently, the exact composition of the Army element needed to overcome any specific threat is best determined on a case-by-case basis. However, there is no doubt about the general characteristics of versatility, deployability, and lethality that Army forces must have to fulfill their strategic roles in the future."³

CONCLUSION

To define what the role and nature of the Army National Guard should be in this next decade, these assumptions, factors, roles and trends must be given serious consideration. Current concerns about deficits, zero-growth and budget reductions are realities. They mandate that the cost effectiveness of the Guard

must be fully considered by Congress and the Executive Branch. Such considerations will then determine the role of the ARNG as an integral part of the first line of defense of the United States.

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CHAPTER V

PROPOSED ROLES AND MISSIONS

This chapter will examine some of the possible roles and missions for the ARNG for the 1990s. The discussion will address topics ranging from narcotics enforcement operations, support of community and civilian activities, to force structure.

WAR ON DRUGS

In identifying possible roles and missions for the Army National Guard in the next decade, the most likely possibility emerges from the nation's recently initiated war on drugs. Where does the Guard fit into this War? What role should the Guard play? What role can it realistically play? How can the Guard fit into the already existing national strategy?

General Powell said the Guard's new mission "to be at the leading edge in the Armed Forces war on drugs," shows the kinds of capability that exists in the Guard today.¹ General Vuono echoed General Powell's statements, saying, "The security of America, in large measure, has rested on the citizen soldiers in our militias and National Guard who have served this great country with valor and distinction." Vuono said, "As America moves into the 1990s and beyond, the Guard will have an even greater role in Defense."²

Secretary of Defense Cheney has declared that "Our specific mission in the Department of Defense (DOD) is to protect national security. There can be no doubt that international trafficking

in drugs is a national security problem for the United States. The DOD will help law enforcement agencies and the National Guard with their training, reconnaissance planning, and logistics missions as related to the war on drugs." Government and private experts agree the threat of war with the Soviet Union is diminishing. As a result, the nation's military services argue that a portion of the Pentagon budget in the 1990s must be devoted to combating drugs. "The military," Representative Les Aspin says, "is going through a real soul-searching. They are looking for a mission." Lawrence Korb, a Pentagon official in the Reagan Administration, when discussing the military's earlier moves to gain a share of the money for drug interdiction programs, observed that "I could not get the services to do anything in the early 80s. Now that there's no Soviet Army to speak of, people look around and see it has become much more palatable."³ Both our congressional and our military leaders have come to endorse using our armed forces in the war on drugs.

Clearly, the leadership of our Armed Forces expect the National Guard to be a player in this war. It is important that the specific roles of the Guard are quickly determined, announced and resourced. The National Guard's role up to this point has been minimal. Participation has been driven by dollars and training philosophy. In the period 1978 to 1987 military support of civil law enforcement officials was encouraged. As LTG

Temple has contended, "We will support only if it does not detract from our wartime readiness."

The Omnibus Drug Law in the 1989 Department of Defense Authorization Act allocated \$300 million for drug enforcement efforts; of which \$40 million went to the National Guard. The importance of this bill was that it finally gave federal funding to the overall effort. Previously, ARNG personnel supported drug enforcement operations incidental to scheduled training with no supplemental federal funds. These additional funds now are being used to fund military pay and operating costs related to drug enforcement efforts. The bottom line: more missions, and they are no longer incidental to training. Typical National Guard support to drug enforcement operations during this period included eradication of domestically grown marijuana and interdiction of illicit drugs entering the United States.

In addition federal funding means guardsmen on state active duty are paid for by the federal government. Thus the 1988 Omnibus Drug Law has resulted in an increase in the types and numbers of missions. Specific types of support include observation and reporting, air and ground transportation, loan of specialized equipment, radar support, aerial imagery and commercial cargo inspections. Missions have greatly increased. There were only four in 1983 when only four states were involved. By 1989, 1811 missions were carried out by 53 states and territories.⁴ However, only about one percent of any state's National Guard is performing drug related missions at any given time.

For fiscal year 1990, planned funding for DOD drug enforcement operations is \$450 million. The National Guard is expected to receive \$70 million of this total for their missions. Whether this amount will be sufficient remains to be seen. In October 1988, each state was tasked to provide its plan for combatting drugs to the National Guard Bureau, who reviewed it and passed it on to the DOD for a more lengthy review. In many cases these plans were hastily drafted; in others the delays in completing the reviews at DOD level meant the quality of many programs suffered. As all of the players acquire experience, plan preparation and execution should be greatly improved. Hence, there may be a demand for more and more funds.

What role should the Guard play? The National Guard should be the focal point for all drug related operations. Who is better qualified to coordinate all of the many different agencies, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), local police, active components, intelligence agencies, and social service agencies to name a few? One of the major criticisms of the operation thus far has been the lack of a single agency to control all of the different phases of this important mission. "Who's in charge has still not been determined. There are 30-40 different agencies now coordinating better than they ever have but still no one is in charge to say what the specific missions are," said MG Ensslin, Florida Adjutant General.⁵ In 1775, George Washington said the Militia is more representative of American society, more popular with ordinary citizens and more consistent with republic ideals than state or continental forces. This is still true

today of our National Guard. Given the value of the experiences our citizen soldiers already have in dealing with civilian and military components and a healthy increase in funds, the Guard can accomplish this difficult mission.

Some states, such as New Mexico, already have the Guard's drug operations officer-in-charge (OIC) and state director of narcotics enforcement coordinating activities. Such centralization of operations should be expanded to the national level.

The ARNG can task organize units to specifically accomplish drug related missions. This consolidates and reduces the "individual" missions now being routinely required. As the active components draw down and some CAPSTONE missions are deleted, Guard units must identify these kinds of specific missions to replace them. By task organizing units for drug operations, the units can maintain Military Occupational Specialty(MOS) proficiency while training and accomplishing much needed drug enforcement missions. Aviation, military police, military intelligence, medical, cavalry, and light infantry units can be organized and trained for drug missions while complimenting their combat roles and functions.

The National Guard should become the primary trainers for all drug related specialties. As MG Ensslin has lamented, "I want my special forces to train personnel like the active component special forces are doing now." Combining the experience that many Guardsmen now have with personnel from the active component as their elements are reduced will yield a high

quality training cadre, which can be developed for all personnel requiring training to join the war on drugs.

Active component equipment that becomes excess as a result of drawdown must be prioritized for Guard units with drug related missions. Equipment priority has previously been based on wartime assignments, but for the 1990s this system must be reversed and units with specific narcotics enforcement missions should receive a higher priority.

The National Guard must be the focal point in the nation's drug control effort. It can make a substantial contribution if its assets are used intelligently and efficiently.

MILITARY SUPPORT OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The Army National Guard has traditionally played a most critical role in military support to civil authorities. As stated in National Guard Regulation 350-1, the Army National Guard has a dual mission:⁶

a. Federal or State: To provide units organized, equipped, and trained to function efficiently at existing strength in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order, and public safety under competent orders of Federal or State authorities.

b. Federal: To provide units with qualified individuals for active service in time of war or national emergency in support of the Army's war plans and at such times as the national security may require augmentation of the active forces.

This dual mission has given a unique role to the Army National Guard. Because Guard units are located throughout the

country, they are ideally suited to support civil authorities. Throughout history, Guard units have been called up for various missions as a result of natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes--as well as fires, strikes, and civil disturbances. Army National Guard support is called on only after all other State resources have been exhausted. Support for State missions must come from State funds.

As we look to the 1990's we can perhaps see even a greater mission for the guard in this area. General Vuono stated in his Strategic Force for the 1990's and Beyond that "Army National Guard units, supported when necessary by the rest of the Total Force, will also be needed to provide the support to civil authorities that has been their traditional responsibility".⁷ National Guard Regulation 500-1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, is the regulation that details policies, procedures, responsibility, and guidance for the employment of Army and Air National Guard units, personnel and equipment in support of civil authorities. This regulation gives details for both State and Federal missions. A close working relationship is needed for coordinating Federal missions as well as State missions.

On the Federal side, Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the key player for coordinating DOD Key Assets Protection Program (KAPP). These are on-going missions coordinated through the appropriate CONUS Army to each State headquarters. Each State headquarters develops plans for these missions. These detailed plans determine required resources. Where there is a joint interest between Federal and State, coordination is effected with the

appropriate State Office of Emergency Government. The last few years has resulted in a closer working relationship at the State level. Each State has a State Office of Emergency Government; currently 23 States are organized so that this office works directly for the Adjutant General or military department for the State. Most recently, Wisconsin has organized in this way. Effective 1 October 1989 The Adjutant General for Wisconsin has three sub-elements under his command: the Wisconsin Army National Guard, Wisconsin Air National Guard, and the Office of Emergency Government. Even with these arrangements, the Governor must approve the utilization of National Guard assets for State Active Duty. The Office of Emergency Government becomes the key coordinator and planner for State; it also coordinates its activities with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The National Guard's role in major disaster relief efforts has been significant. In 1989 alone the Guard was called up for: Hurricane Hugo, the San Francisco Earthquake, Exxon Oil Spill, and the commercial air disaster in Sioux City. Also, each year many State Guard units respond to smaller incidents and disasters. In most major disasters National Guard units are placed on Federal status. Two months prior to the San Francisco earthquake, the California Army and Air National Guard took part in RESPONSE '89, a command post exercise involving several dozen federal, regional, state and local jurisdictions.⁸ Little did they know at that time that this training would be so key to the guard mission and response to an actual earthquake.

Several factors support the ARNG having a key role in military support of civil defense. First and foremost is law and regulation but also because the strategic location of Guard units around the country they are in close proximity to needed areas. It's their "backyard". In addition to being prepared for wartime missions Guard units also maintain readiness for these type missions by having equipment and personnel available to provide protection and safety. As force structure reductions take place Guard units may be required to play an increased role in this area. The State Area Commands (STARCS) are ideally situated to accomplish the required coordination for all potential missions.

However, an increased responsibility in this area will require additional resources. In addition, all agencies, both Federal and State, involved in military support will need to concur with this increased responsibility by the Guard.

Despite these challenges the Army National Guard has always played a key role in this area and will continue to be a viable resource in the future.

NATION-BUILDING

Army National Guard participation in the Overseas Deployment (ODT) program has increased dramatically in recent years. Participation has included such exercises as REFORGER in Europe, Team Spirit in Korea, BRIM FROST in Alaska, and numerous exercises in Central America. The latter experience is an example of the key role the Army National Guard plays especially in the area of nation-building. The Guard has engaged in road building projects, medical support, and other humanitarian

assistance projects. There is no question that civic action and technical assistance to friendly nations in conjunction with ODT has supported our foreign policy and increased United States stature abroad. The ODT opportunities have been provided through JCS exercises such as BLAZING TRAILS/FUERTE CAMINOS and MEDRETE (Medical Readiness and Training Exercises). These exercises have enhanced unit readiness and provided concrete evidence that we are a concerned nation.

Nation-building calls on those skills available in combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. As indicated in Chapter One and below, the majority of the CS and CSS units are found in the Reserve Components. In the Total Army, 68 percent of the combat engineer units, 74 percent of deployable Army hospitals, 87 percent of psychological operations units, 95 percent of public affairs units and 97 percent of civil affairs units are found in the Reserve Components.⁹ Through the ODT program readiness is maintained and tremendous experience is gained, all the way from equipment operators to command and staff planning.

The National Guard involvement proved instrumental during Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Both Air and Army National Guard units participated. Fifty Army National Guard members of the 1138th Military Police Company from Missouri were participating in ODT in Panama when Operation JUST CAUSE went into effect. These MP's moved right into their wartime mission of guarding a prisoner-of-war (POW) camp. Also serving in Panama was the 125th Public Affairs Detachment, Minnesota Army National

Guard, which augmented public affairs support to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) as part of an ODT mission.¹⁰

The ARNG has long been a key participant in this type of training missions. These training opportunities started in 1979, shortly after the CAPSTONE program began. The benefits of the ODT exercises are many. National Guard units can perform their mission while at the same time doing real-world projects--people helping people. The roads that are built, medical missions performed, and bridges constructed are all of immediate benefit to real people. During these deployments, participating units conduct mobilization exercises to take full advantage of the overall ODT opportunity.

As the force structure builds down, we will see a continued need for peace-keeping contingencies. The United States will have a larger role in this area. Humanitarian assistance is a unique way in which this country can provide assistance to poorer democratic nations. Army National Guard units have shown they have the skills to contribute much in this area. In addition, the Air National Guard plays a key role in transporting personnel and equipment to various training sites around the world.

But, the Army National Guard role is key. They can and should be used at all stages of the operation. For example, in Panama the Guard was involved prior to and during Operation JUST CAUSE; it should now be used to assist their reconstruction and development and for humanitarian assistance. Thus, the Guard supports our national strategy by assisting in nation-building to assist in all areas within the infrastructure, agriculture, and

education. All of this raises the host country's standard of living and respect for the United States. According to Major General Cisneros, U.S. Army South Commander, "The National Guard has been a lifesaver to us, I consider them a mainstay of our exercise program here."¹¹

There are many factors that favor the Guards continued role in nation-building. They have proven themselves most capable in engineering, civil affairs, public affairs, and medical tasks in Central America. Defense officials recently were to have said that "in anticipation of its growing role in low-intensity conflicts, either militarily or in an assistance role, the Army is eyeing an increase in its nation-building forces, or those medical and engineer units designed to aid foreign nations".¹² The ODT opportunities for the National Guard have resulted in increased readiness for all participating units. Future missions of this nature, wherever they may be in the world, will support our national military strategy.

There are challenges to continuation of these type missions. Key to success is early notification of participation as well as needed resources. In addition some training has not always been in line with CAPSTONE missions. The significance to this point is that units are still required to maintain preparedness for their wartime mission.

Despite the challenges, the ARNG will play a critical role in providing resources to poorer democratic countries to assist them in nation-building.

NATIONAL SERVICE CORPS

Several bills have been recently introduced in Congress with various strategies designed to raise a national corps of volunteers. All of them are takeoffs on President Bush's proposal for the creation of a national service foundation called "Youth Entering Service," or YES to America.

Each of the proposed bills is intended, in one form or another, to offer young people a voluntary full-time experience that enables them to serve their country, establish a credible work record, and earn financial support for further education and training.

The idea of national service is not new. In 1960, President Kennedy initiated the Peace Corps, wherein service was to be equivalent to military service. In 1966, President Johnson considered national service as a way to reduce the inequities of the draft. In 1977, national service was proposed by many congressmen as the best way to reduce youth unemployment.¹³

Many issues have been debated on how to build a framework for a national service program. These include the amount of funds required, whether the service would be voluntary or compulsory, entry standards, universality, draft versus registration, and what the volunteers would receive in the way of future education benefits, if anything.

All of these discussions eventually raise the question of who is going to administer such a program if it is to ever get off the ground. In 1931, one of the most rapid large scale mobilization efforts our country has ever accomplished came about

through the initiation of the Civilian Conservation Corps(CCC). In a period of a few weeks, the Department of Labor enrolled 250,000 young men. Then the Army transported them to assembly areas in every state in the Union. Although no military training, per se, was conducted, there was indeed military discipline in each of these camps, thanks again to the U.S. Army. The Army assumed the responsibility for feeding, clothing, paying, housing and assimilating the raw recruits into organizations that could go out and provide invaluable assistance to the country.¹⁴ The administrative control of the CCC in the 1930s thus became the responsibility of the War Department. The country was organized into nine corps areas; each area was commanded by an officer of the Reserve Corps of the Army, Navy, or Marines called to active duty for that purpose.

Given the possibilities of a major manpower drawdown in the active component and the resulting decrease in CAPSTONE missions for the ARNG units, the management of the National Service Corps(NSC) program certainly is a possible mission to assign to the Guard. Several factors favor the ARNG being the cornerstone for this program: the Guard already has such facilities as armories and training sites to support the program; the Guard has expertise in such programs as their state operated OCS and NCO Academies to quickly process personnel; this mission will enable citizen-soldiers to compensate for the reduction in CAPSTONE related units; the Guard can recruit young people coming off NSC duty to compensate for the anticipated shortage of recruits in the 18-24 year old category; and the Guard will then have an

opportunity to exercise and modernize the mobilization procedures by implementing it for the NSC program.

However, such a large mission would challenge the Guard. It would be a manpower intensive requirement; it would detract from other missions; and it would require more full-time personnel. Despite these challenges, the Guard could play a vital role in initiating and maintaining a NSC in the Nineties.

BRIGADE BASE STRUCTURE

In addition to roles and missions related to narcotics enforcement and support of community and civilian activities, the ARNG must insure its force structure remains current to accomplish assigned warfighting requirements. The ALBF is a new warfighting doctrine being proposed by the commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). It is based on a much wider battlefield with fewer troops equipped with more sophisticated weapons. The demands of this future battlefield lead us to smaller, more efficient, fighting elements with a requirement for positive control by capable leaders. A key to its success will be the military's ability to quickly tailor forces to meet any global scenario.

These and other factors have lead to the decision to consider structuring our active component current forward-deployed forces into multi-functional, highly mobile combined arms brigade packages. These brigades would fight under an unweighted division configured as a tactical command and control headquarters and would be organized so that they can be moved from one division to another to "mission tailor" them without

completely reconfiguring the division base.¹⁵

If these are the characteristics of the divisions and brigades of our active component forward-deployed units, should not the same requirements apply to the ARNG's units that will be reinforcing them?

Based on the ALBF doctrine, it appears that the Brigade Base Structure, rather than the Division Base Structure, is more appropriate for the most likely threats that the ARNG will be required to fight.¹⁶ Such a brigade base structure would be more self-sufficient, it would be more capable of operating independently, and it would have greater utility and responsiveness in the majority of the roles and missions that the Army requires of the ARNG.

The Brigade Base is not only an appropriate wartime configuration; it may be of even more value to the success of the Guard in peacetime. The changing demographic trends and the anticipated shortages of 18-24 year-old potential recruits in the 1990s will require greater flexibility on the part of the ARNG's leaders to "man the force". Additionally, to have self-sufficient divisional brigades within individual states would permit the ARNG to avoid problems and inefficiencies of splitting DISCOMs and DIVARTYs across state boundaries.¹⁷ The approach also supports the ARNG divisions that are split between states--up to five states in one case--and the round-out brigades by making them more self-sufficient and consequently a more ready force.

Focusing on the Brigade, therefore, results in several

advantages that must not be overlooked. The ARNG's units would be tailored to reinforce a contingency or forward corps; also the unit would be trained and evaluated at the level to which they are organized and charged to fight.

Brigade Base Structure (BBS) would provide peacetime benefits as well. It would support numerous ARNG needs to station and/or restation major combat units in a self-supporting package for training. It is a concept worthy of serious consideration for the 1990s.

ACTIVE COMPONENT ROUND-IN CONCEPT

Retired Army Gen. John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1982 to 1985, told the Senate Armed Service Committee on February 2 that devising a new reserve structure could be the "greatest challenge" the Pentagon faces.¹⁸ To accomplish this difficult mission in this time of constant change, a major Pentagon study of how the military should respond to current and future military threats has been ordered by Congress. The study of the roles and missions of active and reserve units will resolve many issues, ranging from the number of combat support and combat service support units to retain to how much of the ARNG must be kept to fight a large-scale conventional war.

One concept that deserves consideration is the Reverse Roundout, Round-In or Round-Back, as it is referred to in different think tanks. The proposal would combine active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) units into Total Force organizational structures. The concept envisions infusing AC

skills, in unit specific packages, into selected RC units. This integration might be completed in the RC environment or perhaps on AC posts throughout the United States. For the purpose of this discussion, the concept will be referred to as the Active Component Round-In (ACRI) Concept.

The ARNG has many talents to offer the Total Force Policy as we consider the ramifications of the drawdown in Europe, the post closures in CONUS, and the Airland Battle Future initiatives, to name a few. Therefore, there may be a justifiable need to consider stationing AC units with RC units located on select posts in the United States.

Obviously the Army of the 1990s will undergo drastic changes. As we take a look at the kind of force we will need which is highly trained and ready to respond across the wide spectrum of conflict to our Warfighting CINCs requirements, the ACRI designates a viable role for the ARNG in the Total Force Concept.

A possible scenario would look like this: selected roundout brigades now in divisions in CONUS would be replaced with brigades from the divisions being withdrawn from Germany to make a contingency corps fully structured with active component units to rapidly deploy wherever, whenever required. Additional brigades from Germany would return to CONUS and be incorporated with ARNG brigades to form full-up RC divisions and form the reinforcing corps necessary to back up the forward deployed units and contingency corps described in the ALBF concept.

How could this be done? A division in Germany might return to CONUS and one of its brigades would be assigned to the First Infantry Division, one to the Fifth Mechanized Division and one to the Second Armored Division. The brigades of a second division returning from Germany would be assigned as Round-Ins and be stationed at Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; and Gowen Field, Idaho. At these sites, they would be integrated with the local ARNG units to create divisions with reinforcing missions.¹⁹

Another possibility would be to inactivate a brigade in a division and use its one remaining AC brigade to form an ARNG division. For example, inactivate a brigade at Fort Polk in the 5th Mech Division and use the remaining AC brigade, the present roundout brigade and another brigade from the Louisiana/Mississippi Guard to form a Guard Division. The AC Division Headquarters, one Brigade, and selected combat support and combat service support units would then be inactivated. However, by using an AC post, many of the support problems (maintenance, medical, commissary, housing, etc.) would be easier to resolve.

ACRI offers substantial advantages. Presently the ARNG uses numerous posts, in addition to the ones mentioned above, for training, equipping, storage and mobilization. There would be little cost for infrastructuring. ACRI would reduce the RC unit's modernization transition times. It would enhance training. It would prevent the AC from becoming a hollow Army, and finally, fully structured AC units mean more rapid deployment capability.

On the other hand, the ARNG divisions might be too dispersed to train and coordinate effectively. Too many states might be required to form a division. The cost of preparing some posts for AC occupancy might be prohibitive. Further, reconciling training schedules between the AC's weekly routine and the RC's weekend drills would require close coordination. The basic care and feeding of the AC soldiers and their families will require close consideration. Also continuation of Roundout Brigades in the ALB-F concept means more flags, additional costs, and more requirements from RC units for early deployment in the contingency corps.

These examples are not without flaws. They are intended to provide sufficient information to explain the concept as a possible mission for the ARNG. With the requirement to be able to deter low intensity conflict globally and all the while maintain our high-tech hard skills for the mid-to-high intensity conflict, we are forced to find ways to improve our Total Army's conventional deterrence readiness.²⁰ ACRI may be part of the solution.

CONCLUSION

The National Guard, in its unique status, has the capabilities to not only perform wartime missions but accomplish peacetime operational responsibilities as well. Appropriate roles and missions must be determined for the Guard to continue providing forces to preserve the peace and protecting our national security interests. Just as importantly, missions

related to supporting the needs of the American citizens must be carefully selected.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Without doubt, we are witnessing a period of dramatic, worldwide change. We have noted up front the perceptions of a reduced threat, unprecedented withdrawals of troops from Europe, dwindling resources, and major force structure cuts. Recently when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was asked what he expected the United States military to look like in 20 years, he replied, "Twenty years? I'm having trouble staying 20 days ahead right now."¹ The rapid pace of events in the last few months has certainly resulted in many questions about the future. The 1990s will be critical as we prepare for the 21st Century.

The former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG Temple said it well, "The key to the National Guard's future readiness must, therefore, be tied to continuing what we have been doing."²

1. Managing our recruiting and retention efforts to attract and keep good people in the Guard;
2. Ensuring that those people are well trained and used properly in their assigned units;
3. Incorporating every facet of training into a program that permits those training experiences to accumulate or build on each other, whether they take place at the units's armory or

base, or occur in an overseas test of the unit's ability to deploy and operate in a remote area of the world; and

4. Continuing our efforts to modernize the Guard with the introduction of newer, modern equipment with improved capabilities."

This overview of the past, review of current ARNG contributions, and discussion of assumptions and guidance for the future has provided us with a backdrop with which to identify possible future roles and missions for the Guard in the 1990s.

As our nation's leaders seriously consider force structure and mission related questions, they must not only focus on recent history and avoidance of past precedents but more importantly they must remember that maintaining the ARNG's readiness is the only way to ensure a small active force is viable and can fulfill our responsibility to support our national security and military strategies, freedom and self-deterrence worldwide.

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